Comment
The change only updates the pinned SHA-512 checksums for the upstream .deb sources for x86_64 and aarch64. The source URLs remain HTTPS and point to the official Typora download host, with no new build steps, scripts, or packaging logic introduced. I do not see any added execution, persistence, privilege escalation, or integrity red flags in this hunk. Risk is low because the security impact is limited to trusting the new upstream artifacts, which is expected for a checksum refresh.
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ _urlbase="https://download.typora.io/linux/typora_"
source_x86_64=("${_urlbase}${_pkgver_x86_64}_amd64.deb")
source_aarch64=("${_urlbase}${_pkgver_aarch64}_arm64.deb")
sha512sums=('de9c883c63f3ea35bd551c8761e605f8e1a3468943e000abcbf94bb0c5cbb5f0f6c7fa4d49ab39c177f167e0e3d0b061c861bf828627b4a34f7f1589119c3d04')
-sha512sums_x86_64=('a4b92a800731dee9186bcb3ddacbc2c3c99b66c4bec3c905dc80f945eb8900cf88bc0169077bca4660f2d4ea27562099e31093f0782ad1a849b9f4ebbf4de162')
-sha512sums_aarch64=('b10a85fcbdfe89a0e2fc260d06005b60e298fc8f5513e60575d685ef8a679e73d3d90776f17dac03e0a716a05e0ae06bfa69af39a35f19aec910289db4bdfbe7')
+sha512sums_x86_64=('38ed5ce4301def6e4ba1aeb2a4b06e114bde3816b46f3977468dbb738dd7566428f30bc913c3b888f86fd53390bd54f4f6f09b07e5765789091e4bfdf7718006')
+sha512sums_aarch64=('0818ba36cc892e050d5a7550c85d8eb3cd44c614b68e68bb2bcd9583ed0c04059cb3f058f65408a262715201ddf7a8ccbb317558fede1716f914208ab3289dc3')
package() {
# unpack archive