Comment
The change only updates the pinned SHA-256 checksums for the prebuilt Brave ZIPs on x86_64 and aarch64. The source URLs remain HTTPS and point to the official Brave GitHub release assets, with no new build-time network access, scripts, or packaging logic changes. I did not find any indication of added persistence, privilege escalation, or integrity bypass in this hunk. Risk is low because the change is limited to expected upstream artifact refreshes, though as with any binary package the trust boundary remains the upstream release itself.
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ source_aarch64=(${pkgname}-${pkgver}-aarch64.zip::https://github.com/brave/brave
noextract=(${pkgname}-${pkgver}-x86_64.zip ${pkgname}-${pkgver}-aarch64.zip)
sha256sums=('75a87dd17b42fcc6f27adfd16c82bed1c08e9251b07d2012f8d49f7412fa1d00'
'c07276b69c7304981525ecb022f92daf7ae125a4fb05ac3442157b50826e257a')
-sha256sums_x86_64=('9661795c4b961ac1697fe4fa8cadf958b9c30e39e4c8db8f3bb747679c86c2ef')
-sha256sums_aarch64=('bc16f5ed247670f268f502bd4624cee311381a262e8ebf65f7a187123f3b6dd8')
+sha256sums_x86_64=('8c4038e3956088cbf8f658a5e39e1a88b9f710478a8449c94d1c356d8bddc82c')
+sha256sums_aarch64=('4d657f1ef0f2a4b234eb37bd5c7e941317e8f20a6e274756560fb5fd0e091df7')
prepare() {
mkdir -p brave